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91. IntroductIon
In his book “Debt. The first 5000 Years” David Graeber, the spiritus rector 
of the occupy-movement, claims that markets in Mesopotamia were a by-
product of the complex administrative systems there, both of them based on 
credit.1 Of course, this is not the place to give a review of Graeber’s analysis 
of the history of debt, but at least one of the consequences that he draws from 
his analysis may catch our attention, when he postulates with respect to the 
actual crisis we face these days the need for a general debt release2 – a political 
and economic measure which seems rather familiar to ancient legal historians 
and to which we will refer to later in this paper. At the same time the char-
acterization of markets as a “mere” by-product fits in well with the perspec-
tive of quite a number of scholars who deny categorically the effectiveness 
of market principles for Ancient Near Eastern economies.3 One of the most 
prominent representatives of this perspective is definitely Johannes Renger, 
1 Graeber 2012, 404.
2 Graeber 2012, 410.
3 Cf. PfeIfer 2013, 261. For abbreviations cf. the indices in vol. 12 of the Reallexikon für 
Assyriologie und Vorderasiatische Archäologie (Berlin/Boston 2009-2011).
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the German Nestor of Ancient Near Eastern economic and social history, to 
whom the combination of the oikos-system of the temple up to the end of the 
third and the redistributional system of the palace from the second millennium 
BCE onwards on one hand and a sustenance-oriented production on the other 
hand leave little space for competition and therefore for exchange that follows 
market rules.4 On the other hand we have, of course, numerous and clear evi-
dence of both, individual and official exchange of goods. From Renger’s point 
of view this exchange marks but an additional fulfillment of demand.5 Again, 
the purpose of this paper is not, and cannot be, to find a definite answer to the 
question if there was a “market” in Ancient Near Eastern societies or not. This 
paper rather asks for the meaning of the framework that was provided by the 
legal system to the participants of economic exchange as such.
For Max Weber the legal order is one of the decisive factors of an eco-
nomic system.6 The foreseeability of legal rules and their enforcement by the 
political power design the conditions under which the individual participates 
in the economic system and which determinate his or her expectations. The 
chances for a successful participation of the individual that derive from those 
conditions can either be conceived as a mere reflex of the legal rules or even as 
a guarantee.7 Needless to mention that the legal order for Weber doesn’t only 
exist in positive legal rules, but also in customary law with fluent transitions 
between custom, convention and law.8 Against this background it seems rea-
sonable to ask, if, on one hand, our sources show evidence of legal rules that 
refer to economic behavior in a specific way, and if the records of economic 
and legal practice correspond in any way to this reference.
Due to the general topic of this volume the following analysis will con-
centrate on sale, which is, besides of loan and exchange, one of the most 
fundamental institutions and forms of economic behavior. At the same time 
the presentation will be limited to the Old Babylonian period, which provides 
a large number of records as well in the shape of normative texts as texts from 
the legal practice. But as a first step, we will take a short look at the surround-
ing conditions of the Old Babylonian society and economy.
4 For the essence of his reasoning on the basis of several profound studies see the according articles 
in DNP: renGer 1998, 873; renGer 1999, 922; renGer 2000, 1137-1138 and renGer 2002, 
523-526. One of his main references is the work of Karl Polanyi, in particular PolanyI 1957 and 
PolanyI 1977, which Renger locates in the tradition of Max Weber, cf. renGer 1993, 88.
5 renGer 1993, 103-105.
6 Weber 1922, 368-385.
7 Weber 1922, 371.
8 Weber 1922, 374-381.
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2. contInuItIes and chanGes In old babylonIan economIes
Since at the beginning of the Old Babylonian period9 we still can find quite a 
number of smaller city states or kingdoms on the political landscape, it seems 
more accurate to speak of several economic systems rather than one economy. 
Yet, all of them share common features of continuity as well as change, as 
they are compared to earlier times, especially to the Neo-Sumerian period.
2.1 Geographical settings and need for trade
The geographical settings of Ancient Mesopotamia made agriculture based 
on irrigation the main characteristic element of all economic systems of that 
area. The need for irrigation required from the earliest times an effective ad-
ministrative management of the resources of water and soil, including the or-
ganization of additional sectors as the rearing of livestock, pottery or textile 
processing.10 At the same time the permanent need for trade is obvious: As the 
alluvial land was lacking of stone, metals and wood for timber these materials 
had to be imported from the surrounding countries.11 But of course there also 
were forms of an inner-Mesopotamian trade which were brought forward by 
the water routes of the rivers.
2.2 The “individualistic turn” of the Old Babylonian period
The political change of the Old Babylonian period and in particular the estab-
lishment of the empire of the first Babylonian dynasty under king Ḫammurabi 
also led to variations of the economic system. As already mentioned with refer-
ence to Johannes Renger a general shift can be noticed regarding the meaning 
of the temple in favor of the palace and his redistributional system, whereas 
the production as such still remains sustenance-oriented. Under Hammurabi’s 
rule this is closely connected with the implementation of the so-called ilku-
system, i.e. mainly the allocation of land by the crown in favor of individuals 
and the performance of contributions and military services in return.12 At the 
same time we face a phenomenon which is often described in the sense of an 
9 The time from the end of the dynasty of Ur III to the end of the first dynasty of Babylon, i.e. the first 
four centuries of the second millennium BCE, cf. leemans 1960, 2. For the character of the period up 
to the unification of Babylonia under king Ḫammurabi as a “Zwischenzeit” see edzard 1957.
10 marzahn 2008, 236.
11 leemans 1950, 1; leemans 1960, 4.
12 For further details see KIenast 1976-1980, 52-59.
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“individualistic turn” of the Old Babylonian period13 and which is economi-
cally connected to the increase of individual property,14 tenancy and private 
loans, but also socially in the self-reflection of the individual person which 
can be traced in a vast number of private letters from that period15 and which 
indicates an increased self-confidence. This aplomb is also reflected in legal 
documents, particularly from the legal practice.
3. leGal frameWorK of sale ProvIded by normatIve texts
Contracts on sale count among the earliest records of business transactions 
and the impression of the basic meaning of this economic and legal institu-
tion also holds true for the Old Babylonian period. Yet, the turn to normative 
texts could possibly modify this impression, since there the meaning of sale 
seems to be limited compared to other institutions. As normative texts in a 
broader sense we can understand state treaties, law collections and the so-
called mīšarum-acts.
3.1 State treaties
State treaties have been manifold the sedes materiae for legal rules on trade 
and commerce as we can see from the clear evidence by Old Assyrian treaties, 
e.g. from Kanesh, which provide stipulations on taxes, tariffs, compensation 
for losses, means of conflict resolution etc.16 Unfortunately there are no texts 
with comparable content from the Old Babylonian tradition,17 so this category 
of sources has to be left aside.
3.2 Law collections
The so-called law collections from Mesopotamia represent to many scholars 
the most fascinating and most important sources of Ancient Near Eastern legal 
history; at least the intense discussion of their nature and function lasts down 
to the present day.18 This paper acts on the assumption that the law collections 
13 KlenGel 2004, 67-70; marzahn 2008, 244.
14 Especially of fields, cf. edzard 1957, 4.
15 KlenGel 2004, 112-115. For the meaning of letters as a source of information about economic 
conditions see renGer 1993, 87 with fn. 1 and 105 f.
16 veenhof 2008, 183-218; veenhof 2013.
17 Cf. leemans 1960, 119 f.
18 For an overview and bibliography of the discussion see JacKson 2008, 69-113 and 257-276.
13THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF A “MARKETLESS” ECONOMY…
cannot be considered as codifications in a modern sense, but with regard to 
their context of scribal schools they depict a more or less realistic view of 
daily legal life. Given at the same time that they were means of political gov-
ernance there should be no doubt that they at least were meant to be efficient.
a) Laws of Eshnunna
The first law collection that shows clear evidence of legal rules on sale 
is the Laws of Eshnunna (LE) from ca. 1770 BCE.19 However, the §§ 38-41 
LE20 that contain substantial legal rules on sale, deal with quite special cases: 
§ 38 LE applies to the right of pre-emption of a part of a family estate among 
brothers,21 § 39 LE establishes the right of an impoverished man to redeem the 
house he sold, when the purchaser decides to resell,22 § 40 LE refers rather to 
delicts in the context of lost property than to sale as such, when it postulates 
that the seller has to be established by the buyer to avoid the suspicion of theft; 
and § 41 LE is (probably) related to a sale of beer on consignment by a woman 
innkeeper.23 At large and without discussing each section for its own, none of 
those rules seems in a special way likely to determine the economic behavior 
of individuals in a narrower sense, but rather to establish particular decisions 
of practical problems and conflicts in the context of sale. What might be gen-
eralized from those sections is the fact that sale was principally regarded as 
a valid transaction which created, if performed in certain manners, a more or 
less protected legal position (§ 40 LE) which we tend to call “property” or 
“ownership”. At the same time it seems to become clear that the transaction 
of sale could not be executed free from any restriction (§ 38 LE) and that its 
effect could be cancelled under certain conditions, especially in the context of 
social distress (§ 39 LE).
Of further interest for our topic might be the first two sections of the LE.24 
§ 1 lists several articles in certain capacities, all of which equal the price of 1 
19 The Laws of Lipit-Ishtar from Isin (ca. 1930 BCE) do not deal with sale, cf. roth 1997, 23-
35; the sections q and r of the so-called Laws of X (ca. 2050-1800 BCE) are too fragmentary to get 
reliable information from, cf. roth 1997, 38.
20 For the edited and translated text see roth 1997, 65.
21 yaron 1988, 227-232; PetschoW 1968, 139. roth 1997, 65 with fn. 19 understands the section 
in the sense of a right to pre-emption within a partnership.
22 WestbrooK 1985, 109-111; yaron 1988, 232-234.
23 PetschoW 1968, 139; yaron 1988, 227-235. roth 1997, 65 with fn. 20 (70) suggests with 
reference to WestbrooK 1994 that the terms ubarum, napṭarum and mudū refer “to categories of 
persons outside of the common social and jural protective networks”.
24 For the edited and translated text see roth (1997) 59. For measures and weights see PoWell 
1987-1990, 497 and 509.
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shekel of silver, whereas § 2 gives different amounts of grain as equivalents 
to the capacity of one sila (ca. 1 liter) of different articles. Both sections are 
usually understood as tariffs or maximum prices,25 the parallelism of silver 
and grain as standards of value and media of exchange here is often explained 
with a shift from barter to a monetized economy between the Neo-Sumerian 
and the Old Babylonian period.26 The function of these sections right at the 
very beginning of the laws, however, doesn’t become clear by itself: The sec-
tions could have served as a kind of benchmark for the following sections that 
deal with hire – those would have to be understood as minimum rates then, 
in relation to the maximum prices of commodities,27 the same function as a 
benchmark could also hold true in a more general sense, if we think of the 
sanctions for delicts in the LE and other law collections which are expressed 
as fines in weighed silver. The concept of maximum prices could also be seen 
in a further context of social measures, if we consider the law collections to be 
connected with social reforms and debt releases which were also carried into 
effect by the so-called mīšarum-acts, a phenomenon and category of legal lit-
erature we come back to only a little later. As all of these legal provisions are 
closely related to the idea of establishing justice as a universal principle with 
both political and cosmological dimensions and as a duty of the king, it seems 
justified to locate maximum prices as well in a context of social measures as 
it might similarly apply to standardizations of measures and weights as they 
are established e.g. in the prologue of the Laws of Ur-Namma (LU) from Ur 
around 2100 BCE.28
Altogether the legal framework for sale provided by the Laws of Eshnunna is, 
optimistically spoken, rather vague.
b) Laws of Ḫammurabi
The most prominent law collection of the Old Babylonian period is, of 
course, the Laws of Ḫammurabi (LH).29 But also among their 282 sections 
substantial legal rules on sale are rather an exception: § 7 LH and §§ 9-13 LH 
deal with sale as far as lost property is concerned;30 the analogy to § 40 LE 
is evident, although Ḫammurabi’s laws are much more elaborated and give a 
25 Goetze 1956, 32; PetschoW 1968, 135; yaron 1988, 106 f. and 224 f.
26 Korošec 1964, 87.
27 yaron 1988, 225 f.
28 Cf. LU A III 135-IV 149 and C I 11-21, ed. and transl. roth 1997, 16.
29 For the edited and translated text see roth 1997, 46-140.
30 The comprehension of the details is still difficult; for the discussion see KoschaKer 1917, 73-84 
and drIver – mIles 1956, 82-105.
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detailed procedure of a persecution of lost property with all possible eventu-
alities. § 108 LH penalizes the fraudulent woman innkeeper who accepts only 
silver instead of grain for the price of beer and thereby reduces the value of 
beer in relation to the value of grain,31 §§ 278, 279 LH apply to the warranty 
for quality and title of the sale of slaves,32 whereas §§ 280, 281 refer to the 
purchase of slaves abroad and the possibilities of the former owner to release 
them.33 The laws also show rates of hire and wages in §§ 268-277 LH,34 but 
no tariffs or maximum prices. The extent of evidence for a legal framework 
of sale in the Laws of Ḫammurabi insofar doesn’t go beyond the impression 
we got from the Laws of Eshnunna: The transaction of sale creates a protected 
legal position, if performed by means of proof as witnesses and contract (§§ 
7, 9-13 LH) which of course has to be seen in the context of litigation. Fur-
thermore the legal position of the buyer comprises certain claims of warranty 
for quality and title (§§ 278, 279 LH) to which the seller is correspondently 
liable. And again under certain conditions the effect of the transaction can be 
withdrawn (§§ 280, 281 LH).
As a legal framework in the sense of Max Weber’s view of the legal order as 
a decisive factor of an economic system35 these provisions may seem rather 
rudimental; applied to the transaction of sale as a fundamental economic ac-
tivity they mark at least basic points outlining the scope of sale as an economic 
institution.
3.3 mīšarum-acts (Edict of Ammi-ṣaduqa)
The so-called mīšarum-acts were political measures by which the Old Meso-
potamian kings established “justice” (akkad. mīšarum) in the sense of a social 
relief periodically, even though not in identical intervals,36 and thus complied 
with their duty towards the gods.37 They are documented in various forms, 
namely in letters, records and date-lists that refer to them,38 yet the clearest 
evidence comes from several fragments of edicts from the Old Babylonian 
31 drIver – mIles 1956, 202-205.
32 drIver – mIles 1956, 478-482.
33 KoschaKer 1917, 85-100; drIver – mIles 1956, 482-490.
34 drIver – mIles 1956, 469-478.
35 See above fn. 6 f.
36 This marks the difference to the Sabbatical and Jubilee year of the Bible; for the parallels see 
WestbrooK 1995, 149-163.
37 WestbrooK 1995, 159 f.; PfeIfer 2012, 23 f.
38 PfeIfer 2005, 178-182.
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period of which the one of Ammi-ṣaduqa (1647-1626 BCE) is with respect to 
its relative completeness the most important.39 Even though the edicts do not 
prove to have the generalizing character of the legal rules in the law collec-
tions they might be understood as normative in a broader sense: The core of 
the mīšarum-acts is the release from debt and the release from forced labor 
as a consequence of debt.40 Thus their immediate institutional legal context is 
one of private interest-bearing loan as e.g. § 3 Ed. A-ṣ41 shows.
A reference to sale is made as part of the exception to the debt release in § 8 
Ed. A-ṣ.42 Here four different forms of commercial transactions are exempted 
from the debt release; one of them is sale, indicated by the term šīmum (price, 
proceeds of a sale). The three other transaction forms have the character of an 
investment business in common; therefore it is more than likely that šīmum 
here alludes to sale against cash in advance which usually took the face of 
a loan.43 The reason behind this provision seems to be a privilege of com-
mercial business transactions,44 whereas private interest-oriented transactions 
and their consequences were subjected to the social remedy of the edict. The 
impact of this exception on economic behavior should not be underestimated: 
Whereas the release of debts as such could hardly be foreseen and thus marks 
a factor of uncertainty for participants of the economic system,45 the excep-
tional privilege from the debt release for commercial investment transactions 
minimizes the risk of the investors at least in this respect.
mīšarum-acts are insofar less significant for the legal framework of sale 
than rather for the general setting of economic activity.
4. corresPondence to the leGal frameWorK 
In texts from the economIc and leGal PractIce
As mentioned before the legal practice of the Old Babylonian period is well 
documented in a vast number of records which certainly also holds true of the 
institution of sale. If we ask for correspondence of this legal and economic 
39 For an overview of Old Mesopotamian legal acts see Kraus 1984, 14-110.
40 PfeIfer 2012, 22.
41 For the edited and translated text see Kraus 1984, 170 f.
42 For the edited and translated text see Kraus 1984, 174 f.
43 PfeIfer 2005, 181 with fn. 18.
44 For the privilege of business in the context of the palace (§§ 10-12 Ed. A-ṣ) see Kraus 1984, 
215-235.
45 PfeIfer 2013, 262 and 264 f.
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practice to the (admittedly rather small) evidence of a legal framework pro-
vided by normative texts there are two aspects of increased interest: prices and 
legal positions.
Albrecht Goetze has shown that the tariffs of the Laws of Eshnunna more 
or less correspond to the prices we find in contracts of sale from the Ur III 
period, whereas contracts from the time of Ḫammurabi show comparatively a 
rise of most prices.46 As the Laws of Ḫammurabi don’t deliver any tariffs or 
maximum prices of sale, the evidence of a correspondence of the legal prac-
tice to the legal framework from Goetze’s analysis remains questionable in the 
context of our topic. A good example for the rather “free” formation of prices 
gives the tablet VS 8, 81/82.47 Here the commissioner Adad-rē’um is bound to 
sell the received quantity of paint at the kārum of Eshnunna, whereas the prin-
cipal Sin-iqîšam takes the risk or chance to lose or make profit as he is obliged 
to pay a fixed price of 4.5 shekels of silver. Despite of the definite meaning of 
kārum, in particular the question, if the term describes a market in a technical 
sense or not,48 the record makes clear that tariffs or maximum prices were at 
least not always taken into account.
In respect of legal positions the composition of sale contracts shows the 
decisive elements of the transaction: performance of object of sale and price, 
warranty of title and warranty of quality are the crucial points of interest that 
are recorded.49 An example for this practice can be found in the sale of slaves 
in TD 156:50 ll. 15-19 and in particular the phrase kīma ṣimdat šarrim izzazu 
suggest that the clauses refer to the provisions given in §§ 278 and 279 LH, a 
fact which has given rise to an intense discussion.51 Still, the question remains 
– and maybe will never be answered satisfactory –, if the law collections 
merely depicted the legal practice as such or had a decisive impact on it. But 
taken into account that – not only according to Max Weber52 – the legal order 
consists as well of positive rules as of customary law which is documented 
by the legal practice, we have clear evidence that the transaction of sale was 
46 Goetze 1956, 30, supporting there the dating of the LE close to the Ur III period.
47 = VAB 5, 44 = HG 4, 877; for the edited and translated text see leemans 1960, 86.
48 Cf. renGer 1993, 109.
49 WestbrooK 2003, 400 f. The general character of Old Babylonian sale as a cash transaction 
as assumed by san nIcolò 1974, 7 f., should be modified with respect to the legal practice; cf. 
WestbrooK 2003, 401 f. and for the achaemenid period PfeIfer 2010, 145-149.
50 = VAB 5, 85 = HG 5, 1155. Another example, even though not in the context of sale, gives the 
tablet BM 97067, recently published by veenhof 2012, 627 f.
51 See WestbrooK 2003, 401 with fn. 124 and the literature cited there.
52 See above fn. 8.
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regarded as effective and created valid legal positions. This impression is con-
firmed by the large number of litigation documents concerning sales, which 
mainly refer to the vindication of sold commodities, in most cases land and 
houses, of which the tablet TCL 1, 157 gives a good example.53 The litigation 
documents show that the formalities of the sale contracts, in particular wit-
nesses and the record itself,54 enabled the parties to prove and thus assure their 
legal positions in the trial.55
5. conclusIon
Normative texts and texts from the legal practice of the Old Babylonian period 
don’t hand us an elaborated “law of sale” in a modern sense or even in the 
forms we know from the Roman world.56 The extent of the legal framework of 
the economic institution of sale refers to rather basic points of interest, even 
though there is no doubt about the effectiveness of the transaction in principal. 
Therefore the control and allocative function of law for the economic behavior 
in this context has to be described as limited. At the same time it becomes ob-
vious that, regardless of the question, if the Old Babylonian economy worked 
on the basis of market principles or not, the economic system was not an 
unlimited and unrestricted apparatus of its own. In fact the consequences of 
this – from a modern point of view – rather liberal economic system that po-
tentially endangered social and political stability and peace were managed by 
normative measures such as release of debts and of forced labor which applied 
to sale as much as to other economic activities. This management of social, 
economic and legal aspects of community is closely connected to the idea of 
justice as a universal concept57 – which today is as up to date as back then.
53 On this text see recently PfeIfer 2015.
54 WestbrooK 2003, 399.
55 On the further question of conditions and effects of the judgment see recently PfeIfer 2015.
56 For this general result also cf. (related to the LH) PetschoW 1957-1971, 268 and Korošec 
1964, 122.
57 PfeIfer 2012, 32.
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texts
Laws of Eshnunna
§ 1 le (a I 8-17)
1 kur še’um ana 1 šiqil kaspim
3 qa šaman rūštim ana 1 šiqil kaspim
1 (sūt) 2 qa samnum ana 1 šiqil kaspim
1 (sūt) 5 qa nāḫum ana 1 šiqil kaspim
4 (sūt) ittûm ana 1 šiqil kaspim
6 mana šipātum ana 1 šiqil kaspim
2 kur ṭabtum ana 1 šiqil kaspim
1 kur uḫūlum ana 1 šiqil kaspim
3 mana erûm ana 1 šiqil kaspim
2 mana erûm epšum ana 1 šiqil kaspim
300 silas of barley for 1 shekel of silver
3 silas of fine oil – for 1 shekel of silver
12 silas of oil – for 1 shekel of silver
15 silas of lard – for 1 shekel of silver
40 silas of bitumen – for 1 shekel of silver
360 shekels of wool – for 1 shekel of silver
600 silas of salt – for 1 shekel of silver
300 silas of potash – for 1 shekel of silver
180 shekels of copper – for 1 shekel of silver
120 shekels of wrought copper – for 1 shekel 
of silver
§ 2 LE (A I 18-20)
1 qa šamnum ša nisḫātim 3 (sūt) še’ušu
1 qa naḫum ša nisḫatim 2 (sūt) 5 qa še’ušu
1 qa ittûm ša nisḫatim 8 qa še’ušu
1 sila of oil, extract (?) – 30 silas is its grain 
equivalent
1 sila of lard, extract (?) – 25 silas is its grain 
equivalent
1 sila of bitumen extract (?) – 8 silas is its 
grain equivalent
§ 38 LE (A III 23-25, B 7-9)
šumma ina atḫi ištēn zittašu ana kaspim 
inaddin u aḫušu šâmam ḫašeḫ qablīt šānim 
umalla
If, in a partnership, one intends to sell his 
share and his partner wishes to buy, he shall 
match any outside offer
§ 39 LE (A III 25-27, B III 10-11)
šumma awīlum īnišma bīssu ana kaspim 
ittadin ūm šājimānum inaddinu bēl bītim 
ipaṭṭar
If a man becomes impoverished and then 
sells his house, whenever the buyer offers it 
for sale, the owner of the house shall have the 
right to redeem it
§ 40 LE (A III 28-29, B III 12-13)
šumma awīlum wardam amtam alpam u 
šīmam mala ibaššū išāmma nādinānam la 
ukīn šûma šarrāq
If a man buys a slave, a slave woman, an ox, 
or any other purchase, but cannot establish 
the identity of the seller, it is he who is a thief
§ 41 LE (A III 30-31, B III 14-16)
šumma ubarum napṭarum u mudû šikaršu 
inaddin sābītum maḫīrat illaku šikaram 
inaddinšum
If a foreigner, a napṭaru, or a mudû wishes to 
sell his beer, the woman innkeeper shall sell 
the beer for him at the current rate.
20
Laws of Ḫammurabi
§ 7 LH (VI 41-56)
šumma awīlum lu kaspam lu ḫurāṣam lu 
wardam lu amtam lu alpam lu immeram 
lu imēram ulu mimma šumšu ina qāt mār 
awīlim ulu warad awīlim balum šībī u 
riksātim ištām ulu ana maṣṣarūtim imḫur 
awīlum šû šarrāq iddâk
If a man should purchase silver, gold, a slave, a 
slave woman, an ox, a sheep, a donkey, or anything 
else whatsoever, from a son of a man or from a 
slave of a man without witnesses or a contract – 
or if he accepts the goods for safekeeping – that 
man is a thief, he shall be killed
§ 9 LH (VI 70-VII 47)
šumma awīlum ša mimmûšu ḫalqu 
mimmāšu ḫalqam ina qāti awīlim iṣṣabat 
awīlum ša ḫulqum ina qātišu ṣabtu 
nādinānummi iddinam maḫar šībīmi 
ašām iqtabi u bēl ḫulqim šībī mudē 
ḫulqijami lublam iqtabi šājimānum nādin 
iddinušum u šībī ša ina maḫrišunu išāmu 
itbalam u bēl ḫulqim šībī mudē ḫulqišu 
itbalam dajānū awâtišunu immaruma 
šībū ša maḫrišunu šīmum iššāmu u šībū 
mudē ḫulqim mudūssunu maḫar ilim 
iqabbûma nādinānum šarrāq iddâk bēl 
ḫulqim ḫuluqšu ileqqe šājimānum ina bīt 
nādinānim kasap išqulu ileqqe
If a man who claims to have lost property then 
discovers his lost property in another man‘s 
possession, but the man in whose possession the 
lost property was discovered declares, “A seller 
sold it to me, I purchased it in the presence of 
witnesses,” and the owner of the lost property 
declares. “I can bring witnesses who can identify 
my lost property.” (and then if) the buyer produces 
the seller who sold it to him and the witnesses 
in whose presence he purchased it. and also the 
owner of the lost property produces the witnesses 
who can identify his lost property – the judges 
shall examine their cases, and the witnesses in 
whose presence the purchase was made and the 
witnesses who can identify the lost property shall 
state the facts known to them before the god. 
then it is the seller who is the thief, he shall be 
killed; the owner of the lost property shall take 
his lost property, and the buyer shall take from 
the seller‘s estate the amount of silver that he 
weighed and delivered
§ 10 LH (VII 48-61)
šumma šājimānum nādinān iddinušum u 
šībī ša ina maḫrišunu išāmu la itbalam 
bēl ḫulqimma šībī mudē ḫulqišu itbalam 
šājimānum šarrāq iddâk bēl ḫulqim 
ḫuluqšu ileqqe
If the buyer could not produce the seller who sold 
(the lost property) to him or the witnesses before 
whom he made the purchase, but the owner of the 
lost property could produce witnesses who can 
identify his lost property, then it is the buyer who 
is the thief, he shall be killed; the owner of the 
lost property shall take his lost property
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§ 11 LH (VII 62-VIII 3)
šumma bēl ḫulqim šībī mudē ḫulqišu la 
itbalam sār tuššamma iddi iddâk
If the owner of the lost property could not produce 
witnesses who can identify his lost property, he is 
a liar, he has indeed spread malicious charges, he 
shall be killed
§ 12 LH (VIII 4-13)
šumma nādinānum ana šīmtim ittalak 
šājimānum ina bīt nādinānim rugummē 
dīnim šuāti adi ḫamšīšu ileqqe
If the seller should go to his fate, the buyer shall 
take fivefold the claim for that case from the 
estate of the seller
§ 13 LH (VIII 14-24)
šumma awīlum šû šībūšu la qerbu 
dajānū adannam ana šeššet warḫī 
išakkanušumma šumma ina šeššet warḫī 
šībīsu la irdiam awīlum šû sār aran 
dīnim šuāti ittanašši
If that man‘s witnesses are not available, the 
judges shall grant him an extension until the sixth 
month, but if he does not bring his witnesses by 
the sixth month, it is that man who is a liar, he 
shall be assessed the penalty for that case
§ 278 LH (XLVI 58-66)
šumma awīlum wardam amtam išāmma 
waraḫšu la imlāma benni elišu imtaqut 
ana nādinānišu utârma šājimānum kasap 
išqulu ileqqe
If a man purchases a slave or slave woman and 
within his one month period epilepsy then befalls 
him, he shall return him to his seller and the 
buyer shall take back the silver that he weighed 
and delivered
§ 279 LH (XLVI 67-71)
šumma awīlum wardam amtam išāmma 
baqrī irtaši nādinānšu baqrī ippal
If a man purchases a slave or slave woman and 
then claims arise, his seller shall satisfy the claims
§ 280 LH (XLVI 72-87)
šumma awīlum ina māt nukurtim wardam 
amtam ša awīlim ištām inūma ina libbū 
mātim ittalkamma bēl wardim ulu amtim 
lu warassu ulu amassu ūteddi šumma 
wardum u amtum šunu mārū mātim 
balum kaspimma andurāršunu iššakkan
If a man should purchase another man‘s slave or 
slave woman in a foreign country, and while he is 
traveling about within the (i.e., his own) country 
the owner of the slave or slave woman identifies 
his slave or slave woman – if they, the slave and 
slave woman, are natives of the country, their 
release shall be secured without any payment
§ 281 LH (XLVI 88-96)
šumma mārū mātim šanītim šājimānum 
ina maḫar ilim kasap išqulu iqabbīma 
bēl wardim ulu amtim kasap išqulu 
ana tamkārim inaddinma lu warassu lu 
amassu ipaṭṭar
If they are natives of another country, the buyer 
shall declare before the god the amount of silver 
that he weighed, and the owner of the slave 
or slave woman shall give to the merchant the 
amount of silver that he paid, and thus he shall 
redeem his slave or slavewoman
22
Edict of Ammi-ṣaduqa
§ 3 Ed. A-ṣ (B I 8’-17’, A Rs. 1’-2’)
B I 8’ [ša š]e-am ù kù.babbar am [Who b]barley or silver
9’ [a-na lú ak-k]a-d[i]-i ù
lú a-mu-ur-ri-i
[to a man from Akk]ad[e] or
a man from Amurru
10’ [x x x x  m]áš ú-lu a-na
me-el-qé-tim
[............ i]nterest or for
“receipt”
11’ [x x x x x x] x a id-di-nu-ma [..................] ... has given and
12’ [du]b-[p]a-a[m ú-š]e-zi-bu a [in]st[ru]me[nt] has had issu[ed];
13’ aš-šum šar-rum [mi-š]a-ra-am because the king [ju]stice
14’ a-na ma-tim iš-ku-nu for the land has reestablished,
15’ dubpa-šu ḫe-pi his instrument is broken.
16’ še-am ù kù.babbar  a-na pí-i
dub-pí-ma
Barley or silver according to the wording
of his instrument
17’ ú-ul ú-ša-ad-da-an he will not collect.
§ 8 Ed. A-ṣ (B III 1-6)
B III 1 lú ak-ka-du-ú
ù lú a-mu-ur-ru-ú
A man from Akkade
or a man from Amurru,
2 ša še-am kù.babbar  ù
bi-ša-am
who barley, silver or
merchandise
3 a-na ši-m[i]-im a-na kaskal
a-na tab.ba
as purchase [pri]ce, for a ḫarrānu-business,
for a company
4 ù ta-ad-mi-iq-tim il-q[ú]-ú or as non-interest-bearing loan has ta[ke]n,
5 dub-pa-šu ú-ul iḫ-ḫe-ep-pí his instrument will not be broken up,
6 a-na pí-i ri-ik-sa-ti-šu
i-na-ad-di-in
according to the wording of his agreement
he will give.
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Prices of commodities (Goetze 1956, 30)
1 šekel of silver barley wool copper oil
Ur III (contracts) 1 kur 10 minas 2-2.5 minas 9-15 qa
Eshnunna (tariffs) 1 kur 6 minas 2-3 minas 12 qa
Ḫammurabi (contracts) 0.5-0.6 kur 5 minas - 9-10 qa
(1 šekel  
ca. 8,3 g; 1 mina  
60 šekel  
ca. 500 g; 1 qa (sila)  
ca. 1 l; kur  
300 qa (sila)  
ca. 300 l) 
VS 8, 81/82 (VAT 1490 A-B) – tablet – 
obv. 1 1 gún 30 ma.na 1 talent 30 minas
ši-im-tum of paint
ki dzuen-i-qí-ša-am has from Sîn-iqišam
I.diškur-sipa Adad-rē’ûm
5 šu-ba-an-ti received.
 ki-ma kar According to the market(price)
èš-nun-naki of Eshnunna 
rev. kù.babbar ì- la-e he (Adad-rē’ûm) will pay silver
ù 4 1/3 gín kù.babbar And 4 1/3 shekels of silver
10 i-na ša-la-mi-šu on his safe return
ì-la-e he (Sîn-iqišam) will pay.
igi  30-i-din-nam Before Sîn-idinnam,
dumu dingir-šu-a-bu-šu son of Ilšu-abušu.
itu[xxx] In the month of [xxx],
15 mu am-mu-ra-pí(!) lugal year “Ḫammurabi became king“ 
TD 156 (AO 4499), ll. 15-19
[…]
15 itu 1kám be-en6-n[u] One month for bennu-disease,
3 u4mi te-eb-i-tum 3 days for investigation,
a-na ba-aq-ri-šu (and) for vindication
ki-ma ṣi-im-da-at šar-ri according to the royal decree
iz-za-a-a[z-z]u they will be responsible
[…]
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TCL 1, 157 (AO 4657)
Vs. 1
2
3 [1sar é
šà 2sar é]
„[1 Sar Hausgrundstück,
gehörend zu 2 Sar Hausgrundstück]
4-8
Vermerk über vorausgegangene Veräußerungen
9 1sar é  šu-[a-ti …] – di[eses] 1 Sar Hausgrundstück
10-12
Lage beschreibung
13 it-ti dingir-ša-ḫé.gál nu.gig
dumumí dé-a-i l lat-sú
hat von Iluša-ḫegal, der qadištu,
der Tochter des Éa-ellassu,
14 a-n[a] 1[5] gín kù.babbar
[be-le-sú-nu lukur damar].utu
aš-ša-ti
fü[r] 1[5] Šekel Silber
[die Bēlessunu, die nadītu des Mard]uk,
meine Ehefrau,
15 dumumí […] die Tochter des […]
16 i-na mu am-mi-d[i-ta-na …] …
iš-ša-am-ma
im Jahr, als Ammi-d[itana …] …,
gekauft, und
17 k[a]-ni-ik
ši-ma-[tim lu e]l-qí
ich habe die gesiegelte U[rk]unde
des Kau[fs gewiss ge]nommen
18 ù a-na ši-b[u]-tim
 Iì-lí-i-qí-ša dumu-ša
und zum Zeu[gn]is habe ich
den Ili-iqīša, ihren Sohn,
19 ša 2 sar é 
ḫa.la-šu il-qú-ú
ú-ša-ak-ni-ik
der die 2 Sar Hausgrundstück
als seinen Erbteil genommen hatte,
siegeln lassen.
20 i-na-an-na dingir-ša-ḫé.gál
nu.gig dumumí dé-(a-)i l lat-sú
Jetzt hat Iluša-ḫegal,
die qadištu, die Tochter des Éa-ellas-
su,
21 ša k[a]-ni-ik ši-ma-tim ik-nu-
kam
welche die U[rk]unde des Kaufs 
gesiegelt hatte,
22 1sar é  šu-a-ti ip-ta-aq-ra-an-ni dieses 1 Sar Hausgrundstück von mir 
ergriffen.“
23 ki-a-am iq-bi-i-ma So sprach er und
24 Idingir-ša-ḫé.gál nu.gig
dumumí dé-a-i l lat-sú
Iluša-ḫegal, die qadištu,
die Tochter des Éa-ellassu,
25 ki-a-am i-pu-ul [u]m-ma ši-ma so antwortete sie [wi]e folgt: „Den 
Kaufpreis
26 1sar é
šà 2sar é
für 1 Sar Hausgrundstück,
gehörend zu 2 Sar Hausgrundstück,
27 ša [i]t-ti be-le-sú-nu lukur
dza-ba-ba a-ša-mu
das ich [v]on Bēlessunu, der nadītu
des Zababa, gekauft hatte,
28 a-n[a] 1[5] gín kù.babbar a-na
be-le-sú-nu lukur damar.utu
fü[r] 1[5] Šekel Silber der
Bēlessunu, der nadītu des Marduk,
29 [aš-ša-a]t ad-di-li-ib-lu-uṭ
ad-di-in-ma
der [Ehefra]u des Addi-libluṭ
habe ich es verkauft und
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30 1[5] gín kù.babbar [ú-u]l
id-di-nu-nim
1[5] Šekel Silber haben sie mir nicht
gegeben.“
31 ki-a-am i-pu-ul Dergleichen antwortete sie.
32 di.ku5meš dingir-ša- ḫé.gál
lúmeš ši-bi
Die Richter haben von Iluša-ḫegal
Männer als Zeugen (dafür),
33 ša lukur be-le-sú-nu 
kù.babbar la id-di-nu-ši-im
dass die nadītu Bēlessunu
das Silber ihr nicht gegeben hat,
34 ú lu-ma ḫi-ša-am ša
a-na íb.tag4 kù.babbar iz-bu-ši
oder doch einen Schuldschein, den 
sie ihr für den Rest des Silbers aus-
gestellt hat,
35 i-ri-šu-ši-ma 
ú-ul i-ba-aš-šu-ú-ma
verlangt, aber 
sie (d.h. die Zeugen und der Schuld-
schein) existieren nicht und
36 ú-ul ub-lam sie (d.h. Iluša-ḫegal) hat (sie) nicht
herbeigebracht.
37 Iad-di-li-ib-lu-uṭ-ma Addi-libluṭ aber hat
38 ka-ni-ik 
1sar é ub-lam
eine gesiegelte Urkunde über das 
1 Sar Hausgrundstück herbeigebracht
39 di.ku5meš iš-mu-ú Die Richter haben (ihren Wortlaut) 
gehört.
40 lúmeš ši-bi ša i-na ka-ni-ki
ša-aṭ-[ru]
Als die Zeugen, die auf der gesiegelten 
Urkunde geschrie[ben] waren,
41 i-ša-lu(!)-ma sie sie befragten und,
Rs. 
42
ki-ma 15 gín kù.babbar šám 
1sar é.[dù.a]
dass 15 Šekel Silber als Kaufpreis für 
1 Sar
[bebautes] Hausgrundstück
43 Idingir-ša-ḫé.gál
il-qú-ú ši-bu-us-s[ú]-n[u]
Iluša-ḫegal
genommen habe, als ihr Zeugnis
44 ma-ḫar di.ku5meš
a-na pa-ni dingir-ša-ḫé.gál
vor den Richtern
der Iluša-ḫegal ins Angesicht
45 iq-bu-ú-ma sagten,
46 dingir-ša- ḫé.gál a-an-nam 
i-pu-ul
hat Iluša-ḫegal (es) zugegeben.
47 di.ku5meš a-wa-ti-šu-nu i-mu-ru-
ma
Die Richter haben ihre Angelegenheit 
geprüft und
48 Idingir-ša-ḫé.gál nu.gig du-
mumí dé-a-i l lat-sú
der Iluša-ḫegal, der qadištu, der 
Tochter des Éa-ellassu,
49 aš-šum zákišibki-ša ú-pá-aq-qí-ru weil sie ihr Siegel abgeleugnet hat,
50 ar-nam i-mi-du-ši ihr eine Strafe auferlegt
51 ù ṭup-pi la ra-ga-mi-im und diese Urkunde des Nichtklagens
52 an-ni-a-am ú-še-zi-bu-ši haben sie sie ausstellen lassen:
53 u4.kur.šè tim
1sar é.dù.a
„In Zukunft werden bezüglich
1 Sar bebautes Hausgrundstück,
26
54-57
Lage beschreibung
58 ši-ma-at be-le-sú-nu lukur da-
mar.utu
gekauftes Gut der Bēlessunu, der 
nadītu des Marduk,
59 aš-ša-at ad-di-li-ib-lu-uṭ Ehefrau des Addi-libluṭ,
60 Idingir-ša-ḫé.gál dumumeš-ša
aḫ-ḫu-ša
die Iluša-ḫegal, ihre Söhne,
ihre Brüder,
61 ù ki-im-ta-ša a-na be-le-sú-nu oder ihre Familie gegen die Bēlessunu
62 ù ad-di-li-ib-lu-uṭ mu-ti-ša und Addi-libluṭ, ihren Ehemann,
63 ú-ul i-[r]a-ag-ga-mu nicht klagen,
64 mu damar.utu ù am-mi-di-ta-na
šar-ri 
haben sie bei Marduk und Ammi-
ditana, dem König, 
65 in.pà.dèmeš geschworen.“
66-74
Namen von 8 Richtern und des „Bürgermeisters“
75-76 Kontrollvermerk zweier Archivare
l. Rd. 11 Siegel
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